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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda operatives attacked civilian and
military targets on US territory, causing thousands of deaths and billions
of dollars of economic loss. On September 12, the United Nations (UN)
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 characterizing
the attack by Al Qaeda as a "threat to international peace and security"
and reiterating the right of states to use armed force in self defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter.' The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), for the first time in its history, invoked the obligation of
2
collective self defense under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. On
September 14, the US Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF), authorizing the President to use "all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
t Professor of Law, Duke Law School. B.A., 1986, summa cum laude, Yale
University; J.D., 1989, Yale Law School.
I Lecturing Fellow, Duke Law School. J.D., 2008, magna cum laude, Duke Law
School.
1.S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
2. Statement by the North Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(Sept. 12, 2001).

538

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:537

...... Terrorism, conceived until then as crime, was reconceptualizedas war.
On November 13, 2001, invoking the law of war, President Bush
announced that enemy combatants in the US war on terror would be
subject to trial by military commission-a form of military tribunal last
convened under US auspices in the aftermath of World War II. Issuing a
Presidential Military Order (PMO), he said:

To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective
conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks,
it is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to
section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for
violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by
military tribunals ....

The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any
individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom I determine from time to time in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts
of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that
have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause,
injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
national security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described
in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order;
and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be
subject to this order.4

3. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) §§ 1-2.
4. President's Military Order of November 13, 2001 on the Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57831,
57834, § 4 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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The military commissions set in place pursuant to that military order
were struck down by the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld on June 24, 2006. 5 Three months later, under great pressure
from the White House, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (MCA) 6 establishing a new set of military commissions, this
time with Congressional sanction. The MCA established and governs the
military commissions now in operation at the US Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.7
The MCA provisions defining the personal jurisdiction of military
commissions are not nearly as breezy as the provision of the PMO that
would have allowed military commission jurisdiction over any alien to
be determined "from time to time" by the president. The MCA's
provisions governing personal jurisdiction, in fact, are exigent, specific,
and faithful to the law of war-when properly interpreted. The problem
is that they are also remarkably opaque in their wording. At the present
writing, a year and a half after passage of the MCA, the regime
governing the personal jurisdiction of military commissions is as
controversial as it is unclear.
None of the parties to the controversy have called into question the
Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction, which requires that,
"[a]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains."8Indeed, the Court of
Military Commissions Review (CMCR), established under the MCA as
the military commissions' appellate body, invoked the Charming Betsy
9
doctrine in its first (and, to date, only) opinion construing the MCA.
But, oddly, none of the opinions rendered by the military
commissions or the CMCR actually has offered a comprehensive
analysis of the substantive and procedural requirements for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by military commissions under the international
law of war.10 Without such an articulation of the international law in
question, attempts to interpret the MCA's jurisdictional provisions
"consistently" with international law have been something of a muddle.
The result has been not only a degree of disarray in the functioning and
jurisprudence of the military commissions but, also, damage to the

5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).

6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-950.

7. BBC News, Q&A: Guantanamo Tribunals, Feb. 12, 2008, available at
2
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/51343 8.stm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
8. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
9. U.S. v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001,25 (2007).
10. See, e.g., id.
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integrity of the international law of war-including, particularly,
prisoner-of-war (POW) protections.
The present article will seek, in Section II, to delineate the
international law of war governing the personal jurisdiction of military
commissions. Section III will examine the relevant opinions rendered by
the Guantanamo military commissions and the CMCR to date in the light
of the law of war as delineated in Section II. Section IV will parse the
jurisdictional language of the MCA and will argue that, properly
construed, the personal jurisdiction framework of the MCA is both
internally coherent and entirely consistent with the law of war. Section V
will demonstrate that, in each case brought under the MCA to date,
military commission jurisdiction has been exercised over an individual
entitled to presumptive POW status, in violation of both the MCA and
the law of war. The article will conclude by suggesting that the remedy
for this continuing violation of both US and international law is both
easy and urgent.
This article will not question the wisdom of seeking to apply the
traditional law of war to the context of modem jihadist terrorismthough there is much to question. Rather, the present article will assume
the applicability of the law of war and then ask what that law demands if
detained 'combatants' are to be prosecuted before military commissions
for offenses arising out of the 'hostilities.'

II. MILITARY COMMISSION JURISDICTION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF WAR
The law of war exists to reduce human suffering in armed conflict.
Those taken prisoner by the enemy are vulnerable to profound brutality
by their captors. The law of war, to the extent it is effective, provides
protection for those held in enemy control.
All persons held in the control of enemy forces in an armed conflict
are entitled, under the law of war, to a minimal standard of humane
treatment. H Only "lawful combatants," however, are entitled, if they fall
into the control of the enemy, to be deemed "prisoners of war" (POWs)

11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12
1949, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter "GC
"POW Convention"]; Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims on International Armed Conflicts,
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "Protocol I"]; see also Hamdan, 548
562-63.

August
III" or
August
art. 75,
U.S. at
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and accorded the additional rights and privileges attending that legal
status. 12
In addition to the other rights afforded to those with POW status, "[a]
prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been
pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the
case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.

,,3 In

accordance with this requirement, the MCA provides that the military
conm-issions established under the Act shall have jurisdiction only over
unlawful combatants.' 4 Lawful enemy combatants detained by the
15
United States, the Act specifies, are entitled to trial by court martial.
The jurisdictional structure delineated by the MCA, properly interpreted
and applied, ensures compliance with both the trial rights of POWs and
the procedural requirements for combatant status determinations under
the law of war.
POWs benefit from POW rights only when POW status is
acknowledged. The safeguards and procedures governing combatant
status determinations under the law of war, therefore, form the linchpin
of all POW protections.
The core safeguard for POW rights under the law of war turns on a
presumption. All combatants held in the control of the enemy are
presumed to be entitled to all POW rights and protections unless and
until they are6 determined, through specified legal procedures, to lack
POW status. 1
The law of war permits of only one means through which the
presumption of entitlement to POW rights may be rebutted: a
determination of unlawful combatant status made by a "competent
tribunal." Article 5 of the POW Convention states:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [defining
lawful combatants], such persons shall enjoy the protection of
as their status has been
the present Convention until such time
7
determined by a competent tribunal. '

12. See GC III, supra note 11.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id., at art. 102.
10 U.S.C. § 948d(a).
10 U.S.C. § 948d(b).
See GC III, supra note 11.
Id.
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A combatant who is held as a non-POW-that is, who has been duly
determined by a competent tribunal to be an unlawful combatant-and
who is to be prosecuted by enemy forces for crimes arising out of the
hostilities-isentitled to a second, de novo status determination, made by
a judicial body. The law of war thus mandates a two-tiered status
determination process if a detained combatant who is not held as a POW
is to be tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities.
This two-step system is codified in Article 45 of Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.18 The first paragraph of
Article 45 reiterates and elaborates upon the core safeguard articulated in
Article 5 of the POW Convention: the presumptive entitlement of all
detained combatants to POW treatment unless and until a competent
tribunal determines that they are not entitled to POW status. Paragraph 1
thus states:
A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of
an adverse Party shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war, and
therefore shall be protected by the Third Convention, if he
claims the status of prisoner of war, or if he appears to be
entitled to such status, or if the Party on which he depends
claims such status on his behalf by notification to the detaining
Power or to the Protecting Power. Should any doubt arise as to
whether any such person is entitled to the status of prisoner of
war, he shall continue to have such status and, therefore, to be
protected by the Third Convention and this Protocol until such
time as his status has been determined by a competent tribunal.19
Article 45, in its second paragraph, articulates the additional
safeguard-the right to a combatant status adjudication before a judicial
tribunal-to be afforded to a detained combatant who is "not held as a
prisoner of war" and is to be "tried for an offense arising out of the
hostilities." Paragraph 2 thus provides:
If a person who has fallen into the power of an adverse Party is
not held as a prisonerof war and is to be tried by that Party for
an offence arising out of the hostilities, he shall have the right to
assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a judicial
tribunal and to have that question adjudicated. Whenever

18. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 45(1).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
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possible under the applicable procedure, this adjudication shall
occur before the trial for the offence.2z
A detainee who is "not held as a [POW]"-as stated in paragraph 2
of Article 45-is, necessarily, either one who does not claim POW status
or one who has been determined by a competent tribunal not to be
entitled to POW status. A detainee who claims POW status may lawfully
be held as a non-POW only if a competent tribunal had found him to be
an unlawful combatant. In the absence of that determination by a
competent tribunal, the presumptive entitlement to POW treatment
remains in force. Consequently, the person, referred to in Article 45(2),
who is "not held as a [POW] and is to be tried for an offense arising out
of the hostilities" and who "assert[s] his entitlement to [POW] status"
and, thereby, gains "the right to [a status adjudication]," is, necessarily, a
person who has already been found, by a competent tribunal, to be an
unlawful combatant.
The Article 45 status adjudication necessarily is, thus, a separate
proceeding, additional to the competent tribunal determination that
overcame the initial presumption of POW status and thereby permitted
the detainee to be "not held as a POW." If a detainee "not held as a
POW" is to be prosecuted by the detaining power for crimes arising out
of the hostilities, then, in light of the heightened significance of the
combatant status determination-which will now significantly define the
applicable trial rights-that determination is to be made, de novo, by a
judicial body.2 1
The US has long endorsed the two-tiered status determination
procedure codified in Article 45 as a binding feature of the customary
international law of war, and has advocated its recognition and
enforcement. Protocol I was negotiated in the wake of the severe
mistreatment of US soldiers who were wrongfully denied POW status
and summarily convicted as war criminals in North Vietnam. "North
Vietnam," as Howard Levie has written:
[S]tated, in effect, that it would regard captured Americans as
'pirates,' people who have destroyed the property and massacred
the population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as major
war criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for judgment

20. Protocol I, supranote 11, art. 45(2) (emphasis added).

21. Id.
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in accordance with the laws of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam.22
With the shadow of the US experience in North Vietnam still
looming, Protocol I was promulgated, with US support and leadership, to
bolster the efficacy of the law of war. Article 45 was fostered by the
United States to strengthen POW protections by entitling any detainee to
a public, judicial proceeding to determine combatant status-de novobefore that person could be tried for war crimes without full POW rights
at trial.2 3
Because the United States opposed certain provisions of Protocol I as
it was ultimately adopted, the United States did not become a party to the
treaty. 24 Yet there were certain provisions adopted in Protocol I that the
United States not only supported, but viewed as crucially important.2 5
The US, therefore, in 1987, identified and endorsed specific provisions
of Protocol I as customary international 26law, and urged other states also
to recognize those provisions as binding.
Article 45 of Protocol I featured prominently among the provisions
that the United States so endorsed. Delineating the official US position
on Protocol I, Michael Matheson, then-Deputy State Department Legal
Adviser, specifically and unequivocally articulated the US endorsement
of the presumption of entitlement to POW rights for all combatants held
by the enemy; the requirement that the presumption may be rebutted only
by a contrary status determination by a competent tribunal; and the right
to a judicial adjudication of combatant status where an individual held as
a non-POW is to be tried for crimes arising from the hostilities. As he
stated:
We do support the principle that, should any doubt arise as to
whether a person is entitled to combatant status, he be so treated
until his status has been determined by a competent tribunal, as
well as the principle that if a person who has fallen into the
power of an adversary is not held as a prisoner or war and is to
22. Howard Levie, The US Position on the Relation of Customary InternationalLaw
to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks of H. Levie,
2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 419, 535 (1987).
23. Id.
24. See Michael Matheson, The U.S. Position on the Relation of Customary
InternationalLaw to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
Remarks before Session One of the HumanitarianLaw Conference, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L.

& POL'Y 419 (1987).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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be tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities, he should be
have the right to assert his entitlement before a judicial tribunal
and to have that question adjudicated. Those principles are found
in Article 45.27
27. Id. at 425-26. The Government suggested in its Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief in
U.S. v. Khadr, that, rather than endorsing Article 45 as customary international law, Mr.
Matheson in fact "affirmatively disclaimed the 'customary' legal effect of Article 45."
Prosecution Reply to Amicus Curiae at 4, U.S. v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 (2007)
(emphasis added). The Government quotes Mr. Matheson as saying:
[W]e support the principle that persons entitled to combatant status be treated
as [POW] in accordance with [GC III], as well as the principle that combatant
personnel distinguish themselves from the civilian populations while engaged
in military operations. Those statements are, of course, related to but different
from the content of Article[] ...45.
Id. The Government's use of that quotation reflects a point of confusion. That confusion
arises from an error (probably typographical) in the text of Matheson's remarks as
published. To resolve that confusion we must look at the full quotation, without ellipses.
Picking up where the Government's quotation leaves off, the statement reads as follows:
[R]elated to but different from the content of articles 44 and 45, which relax the
requirements of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning prisoner-of-war
treatment for irregulars, and, in particular, include a special dispensation
allowing individuals who are said to be unable to observe this rule in some
circumstances to retain combatant status, if they carry their arms opening
during engagements and deployments preceding the launching of attacks.
Id. On the other hand, we do [at this point we pick up Matheson's statement about article
45, quoted above] support the principle that, should any doubt arise as to whether a
person is entitled to combatant status, he be so treated until his status been determined by
a competent tribunal, as well as the principle that if a person who has fallen into the
power of an adversary is not held as a [POW] and is to be tried for an offense arising out
of the hostilities, he should have a right to assert his entitlement to [POW] status before a
judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated. Those principles are found in
Article 45. Matheson, supra note 24, at 425-26 (emphasis added). Matheson's two
statements, as reproduced in the published text, are contradictory. The first says that the
US rejects the provisions of Article 45, and the second says that the US supports the
provisions of Article 45. The contradiction was caused by the erroneous inclusion of the
words "and 45" in the first paragraph of the quotation. The present authors have
determined, through two means, that the reference to Article 45 in the first paragraph was
inserted in error. The first is simply a reading of Articles 44 and 45. Article 45 contains
nothing that "relax[es] the requirements ...concerning prisoner-of-war treatment for
irregulars," or that "allow[s] individuals who are said to be unable to ...distinguish
themselves from the civilian populations in some circumstances to retain combatant
status." Id. Article 45, in fact, contains nothing relating to the requirements for prisonerof-war status. In other words, the reference to Article 45 in the first paragraph quoted just
makes no sense. By contrast, Article 44, which is also cited in the first paragraph of the
quote, consists of eight paragraphs defining the requirements for prison-of-war status,
including several that relax the requirements concerning prisoner-of-war treatment for
irregulars. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 44.Subsection 3 of Article 44, in particular,
states: "[W]here ...an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself [from the civilian
at art. 44(3). The logical
population], he shall retain his status as a combatant ...."Id.
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Abraham Sofaer, then-State Department Legal Adviser, stated at the
same meeting that, "[w]e therefore intend to consult with our allies to
develop appropriate methods for incorporating these provisions ... into
rules that govern our military operations. .28
The US has, indeed, incorporated the provisions of both Article
45(1) and (2) into its regulations and operational guidelines 29 and has
identified those provisions as reflecting customary international law. 30
Most recently, the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR)
cited the rights embodied in Article 45(2) as forming part of the
customary international law of war. 3' As will be discussed shortly,
however, the CMCR, even while endorsing compliance with that
provision, failed to issue a holding actually in compliance with the law
embodied therein.
In sum, under the international law of war-recognized and endorsed
as such by the United States and implemented in US law and
regulations-all combatants held by enemy forces are presumed to be
conclusion is that only Article 44, and not Article 45, was supposed to be included in the
first paragraph. This conclusion is borne out by another aspect of the first paragraph of
the Matheson quotation. Matheson states that "the executive branch regards this provision
as highly undesirable .... Matheson, supra note 24, at 425-26. Matheson apparently
intended to refer to one article ("this provision"), not two, in the first paragraph. The
authors confirmed this point by telephone with the State Department officials directly
involved at the time. They confirmed that the reference to Article 45 in the first paragraph
of the quotation was unintended.
28. Abraham Sofaer, The U.S. Position on the Relation of Customary International
Law to the 1977 ProtocolsAdditional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 419,471 (1987).
29. See ARMY REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL,
CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES § § 1-1(b), 1-6 (Oct. 1, 1997) (stating that in
an army regulation with the express purpose of "implementing customary international
law, both customary and codified relating to [Enemy Prisoners of War]," "a competent
tribunal shall determine the status of any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner
of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in
the aid of enemy forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a
prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists"); see also
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NWP 1-14M: THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11-3 (1995), available at http://lawofwar.org/naval warfarepublicationN-114M.htm (last .visited Sept. 30, 2008) ("Should a question arise
regarding a captive's entitlement to prisoner of war status, that individual should be
accorded prisoner-of-war treatment until a competent tribunal convened by the captor
determines the status to which that person is properly entitled. Individuals captured. . . as
illegal combatants have the right to assert their claim of entitlement to prisoner-of-war
status before a judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated.").
30. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, JA 422 at 18-2 (1997); JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY,
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK,

Ch. 2 (2002).

31. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 at 25 n.36.
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entitled to POW rights and protections.3 2 That presumption may be
rebutted only through the determination of unlawful combatant status by
a competent tribunal. A combatant who is held as a non-POW and is to
be tried by enemy forces for crimes arising from the hostilities, has the
right to assert POW status and to have a judicial adjudication of status,
separate and distinct from the status determination earlier made by a
competent tribunal. 33 The status adjudication provides one additional
protection against the wrongful deprivation of POW rights to a
combatant who is, in facing criminal prosecution by the enemy, in a
singularly vulnerable position.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL RULINGS OF THE GUANTANAMO MILITARY
COMMISSIONS AND THE COURT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS REVIEW

The law of war governing the intersection of combatant status
determination procedures and military commission jurisdiction is, as
described in the preceding section, quite clear. And, as we shall see in
Section IV, the jurisdictional provisions of the MCA, when interpreted
consistently with the law of war, become quite clear. The actual practice
and rulings of the Guantanamo military commissions and the CMCR
concerning personal jurisdiction, however, have not yet reached a point
of equilibrium.
On June 4, 2007, the parties in U.S. v. Khadr convened in
Guantanamo Bay for the arraignment of Omar Khadr before military
34 Acting on his own
commission Judge Colonel Peter Brownback.
motion, Judge Brownback dismissed Khadr's charges for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Judge Brownback's remarkable ruling warrants
reproduction in full. He ruled as follows:
1. A military commission is a court of limited jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction is set by statute-the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA).
2. Section 948d establishes the jurisdiction of a military
commission. 948d(a) states:
(a) JURISDICTION.-A military commission under this chapter
shall have jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by this

32. See GC III, supra note 11.

33. See Protocol I, supra note 11.
34. See Khadr, CMCR 07-00 1.
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3. Section 948d(b) specifically states that military commissions
"shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants."
4. Thus, in the MCA, Congress denominates for the purpose of
establishing jurisdiction two categories of enemy combatantslawful and unlawful. A military commission only has
jurisdiction to try an unlawful enemy combatant.
5. Further, in Section 948d(c), Congress stated that a finding by a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that a person is an
unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of
jurisdiction by military commissions.
6. In considering Section 948d, it is clear that the MCA
contemplates a two-part system. First, it anticipates that there
shall be an administrative decision by the CSRT which will
establish the status of a person for purposes of the MCA. The
CSRT can find, for MCA purposes, that a person is a lawful
enemy combatant or an unlawful enemy combatant.
7. Second, once the CSRT finds that a person is an unlawful
enemy combatant, the provisions of the MCA come into play.
Such person may have charges swom against him, those charges
may be referred to a military commission for trial, and a military
commission may try him. A strict reading of the MCA would
appear to require that, until such time as a CSRT (or other
competent tribunal) makes a finding that a person is an unlawful
enemy combatant, the provisions of the MCA do not come into
play and such person may not be charged, charges may not be
referred to a military commission for trial, and the military
commission has no jurisdiction to try him.
8. There is, of course, the counter-argument. The military
commission itself is a competent tribunal (948d(c)) to determine
if a person brought before it is an unlawful enemy combatant.
While appealing, this argument has two major flaws:
a. First, in order to make the determination, the military judge
would have to conduct a mini-trial to decide if the person is an
unlawful enemy combatant. Or would s/he? Perhaps, since this
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determination might require factual determinations, the panel
would have to make it. Congress provided in the MCA for many
scenarios-none anticipated that the military commission would
make the lawful/unlawful enemy combatant determination.
b. Second, a person has a right to be tried only by a court which
he knows has jurisdiction over him. If the military commission
were to make the determination, a person could be facing trial
for months, without knowing if the court, in fact and in law, had
jurisdiction.
9. Persons familiar with the court-martial system might state that
jurisdiction is always assumed by the court-martial and it is
attacked only by motion. That is true, but a court-martial is a
different creature than a military commission. A soldier is in
court in uniform with her first sergeant and company commander
(who most likely preferred the charges) sitting in the courtroom.
DD Form 458, the Charge Sheet, contains the following
information in Block I-Personal Data: Name of accused, SSN,
Grade or Rank, Pay Grade, Unit or Organization, Initial Date and
Term of Current Service, Pay Per Month, Nature of Restraint of
Accused, and Date(s) Imposed. So when a military judge at Fort
Bragg looks at the Charge Sheet and the accused (Who is in
uniform.), she knows that Private First Class William B. Jones is
a member of Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion (Airborne), 325th
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort
Bragg, North Carolina. She knows how much he is being paid, if
he has been restrained, when he came on active duty this tour,
and by comparing the unit to the name of the accuser in Block
III-Preferral-she can see if it was PFC Jones' company
commander who preferred the charges.
10. Contrast this with the information on MC Form 458 in this
case. The military judge is told that the name of the accused is
Omar Ahmed Khadr. Three aliases are given. And, the last four
of an unidentified acronym, the ISN, are given. There is nothing
on the face of the charge sheet to establish or support jurisdiction
over Mr. Khadr, except for a bare allegation in the wording of
the Specifications of the Charges
11. The military judge is not ruling that no facts could be
properly established concerning Mr. Khadr which might fit the
definition of an unlawful enemy combatant in Section 948a(a) of
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the MCA. The military judge is ruling that the military
commission is not the proper authority, under the provisions of
the MCA, to determine that Mr. Khadr is an unlawful enemy
combatant in order to establish initial jurisdiction for this
commission to try Mr. Khadr.
12. The military judge is not ruling that Mr. Khadr may not, if
his case is referred to trial after a proper determination, attack
those facts in the elements of the offenses referred which might
combine to show him to be an unlawful enemy combatant. Such
an attack is a proper part of a military commission.
13. The military judge is not ruling that the charges against Mr.
Khadr must be reswom. That would seem to be the more prudent
avenue to take, but that issue is not currently before this
commission.
14. If there were no two-step process required to try a person
under the MCA, then a prosecutor could swear charges, the
convening authority could refer charges, and a military
commission could try a person who had had no determination as
to his status whatsoever. That is not what Congress intended to
establish in the MCA.
16. The charges are dismissed without prejudice.
Peter E. Brownback III
COL, JA, USA
35
Military Judge

In response to Judge Brownback's dismissal of the charges, the
Government moved for reconsideration. When the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the Government appealed Judge
Brownback's
decision to the Court of Military Commission Review
36
(CMCR).
On September 24, 2007, the CMCR issued its first opinion, in which
it overturned in part and upheld in part Judge Brownback's ruling
35. See generally Khadr, CMCR 07-001.
36. See Khadr v. U.S., 529 F.3d 1112, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (outlining the procedural
history of the case).
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dismissing the charges against Khadr.37 The CMCR affirmed the ruling
insofar as it held that a determination of "enemy combatant status" by a
competent tribunal is not equivalent to a determination of "unlawful
enemy combatant status" and, so, cannot suffice as a basis for military
commission jurisdiction under the MCA.38
The CMCR reversed Judge Brownback's ruling insofar as its held
that a military commission may not exercise even initial jurisdiction
absent a prior finding of unlawful combatant status by a competent
tribunal. 39 The CMCR opined that Judge Brownback had erred "in
concluding that a C.S.R.T. (or other competent tribunal) determination of
'unlawful enemy combatant' status was a prerequisite to referral of
charges to a military commission and [in concluding] that ... he lacked
authority under the MCA to determine whether Mr. Khadr is an
'unlawful enemy combatant' for purposes of establishing the military
40
commission's initial jurisdiction to try him."
The relevant portion of the CMCR opinion is as follows:
In our opinion, the M.C.A. is clear and deliberate in its creation
of a bifurcated methodology for establishing an accused's
"unlawful enemy combatant" status so as to permit that
individual's trial before a military commission. These two
methods are laid out in M.C.A. § 948a(1)A where an "unlawful
enemy combatant" is defined as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al
Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to
be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the
authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
(emphasis added). The disjunctive "or" between subsections (i)
and (ii) clearly sets forth alternative approaches for establishing
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Khadr, CMCR 07-001.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-20.
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military commission jurisdiction. The military judge did not
apply the disjunctive separation of these two provisions, and
erroneously interpreted the distinct provisions as if written in the
conjunctive; that is, as if joined by the word "and" rather than
"or." Such an interpretation would render subsection (i) nothing
more than a definition in aid of a C.S.R.T. (or other competent
tribunal) determination of combatant status under subsection (ii),
and is contradictory to the statute's clear structure, wording, and
overall intent.
Upon challenge, the first method by which the M.C.A.
contemplates jurisdiction being established is by evidence being
presented before the military judge factually establishing that an
accused meets the definition of "unlawful enemy combatant" as
contained in subsection (i). .. There is a long and welldeveloped tradition in U.S. federal courts and, specifically,
throughout military court-martial jurisprudence of military
judges deciding matters of personal jurisdiction. Congress . . .
would not have deprived military commissions of the ability to
independently decide personal jurisdiction absent an express
statement of such intent. No such statement is contained
anywhere in the M.C.A.
The military judge's reliance on M.C.A. § 948a(l)(A)(ii) for the
proposition that a military commission itself cannot determine
personal jurisdiction is misplaced. This provision supports
Appellant's position rather than detracts from it. Although
Congress assigned a jurisdictional "safe harbor" for prior
C.S.R.T. (or other competent tribunal) determinations of
"unlawful enemy combatant" status by statutorily deeming them
"dispositive" of jurisdiction, it did not in any way preclude
Appellant from proving jurisdiction before the military
commission in the absence of such a determination. Indeed, the
existence of a statutorily recognized path to achieve a
"dispositive" determination of jurisdiction suggests that pretrial
procedures and pleadings alleging jurisdiction should simply be
viewed as "nondispositive." Subsection (ii) does not eliminate
traditional methods of proving jurisdiction before the
commission itself. We agree with Appellant's suggestion that
Congress, through subsection (ii), merely carved out an
exception to the military commission's authority to itself
determine jurisdictional matters. As Appellant notes, subsection
(ii) makes it clear that the military judge is not at liberty to
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revisit a C.S.R.T.'s (or other competent tribunal's) finding of
"unlawful enemy combatant" status when there is such afinding.
However, nothing in the M.C.A. requires such a finding in order
to establish military commission jurisdiction. Had they so
intended, Congress could have clearly stated in the M.C.A. that
the only way to establish military commission jurisdiction is
through a prior C.S.R.T. (or other competent tribunal)
determination of "unlawful enemy combatant" status. It did not.
Accordingly, we may properly find-as clearly indicated in the
language of M.C.A. §§ 949a(a) and 948b(c)-that Congress
intended for military commissions to "apply the principles of
law" and "the procedures for trial [routinely utilized] by general
courts-martial ... ." This would include the common procedures
used before general courts-martial permitting military judges to
hear evidence and decide factual and legal matters concerning
the court's own jurisdiction over the accused appearing before it.
This view is supported in the Rules for Military Commissions,
which provide exactly such procedures ....

Clearly, these rules

contemplate potential litigation of personal jurisdictional issues
by the military commission, and provide the procedures
necessary to address such a challenge. If the only avenue to
achieve military commission jurisdiction was through a
previously rendered C.S.R.T. (or other competent tribunal)
determination of "unlawful enemy combatant" status, all of these
rules would be superfluous, as "dispositive" jurisdiction would
have attached before the fact.
The text, structure, and history of the M.C.A. demonstrate
clearly that a military judge presiding over a military
commission may determine both the factual issue of an
accused's "unlawful enemy combatant status" and the
corresponding legal issue of the military commission's in
personam jurisdiction. A contrary interpretation would ignore
the bifurcated structure of M.C.A. § 948(l)(A) and the longstanding history of military judges in general courts-martial
finding jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence,
and resolving pretrial motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The M.C.A. identifies two potential jurisdiction-establishing
methodologies based upon an allegation of "unlawful enemy
combatant" status. The first, reflected in § 948a(l)(A)(i),
involves the clear delineation of the jurisdictional standard to be
applied by a military commission in determining its own
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jurisdiction. The second, contained in § 948a(l)(A)(ii), involves
a non-judicial related jurisdictional determination that is to be
afforded "dispositive" deference by the military commission.
Either method will allow the military commission's exercise of
jurisdiction where "unlawful enemy combatant" status has been
established by a preponderance of the evidence. This
interpretation is consistent with the requirements of both the
M.C.A. and with international law. See Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (acts of
Congress will generally be construed in a manner so as not to
violate international law, as we presume that Congress ordinarily
seeks to comply with international law when legislating). 4'
The CMCR opinion, thus, envisions a system in which a competent
tribunal determination, if one has been made, preempts a determination
of combatant status by the military commission. In the system
envisioned, the existence of a determination of unlawful combatant status
by a competent tribunal precludes a military commission's making a
determination of combatant status to confirm or disconfirm its own
jurisdiction.
Such a system would be beset with problems. Would a military
commission presented with new evidence proving the lawful combatant
status of the accused be required nevertheless to treat as dispositive the
status determination made by the competent tribunal and proceed to
exercise jurisdiction over a demonstrably lawful combatant? Would a
court deprived of the "inherent jurisdiction to determine its own
jurisdiction" be a "regularly constituted court?"
The CMCR itself poses the question "whether this 'dispositive
jurisdiction' provision deprives a military commission accused of a
critical 'judicial guarantee[] ... recognized as indispensable by civilized
people' under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (i.e., the
right to affirmatively challenge the commission's in personam
jurisdiction over him). 42
In addition to posing those serious difficulties, the prohibition on a
military commission's adjudicating combatant status in cases where a
status determination had been made by a competent tribunal would
violate Article 45 of Protocol I (which the CMCR opinion cites, in
footnote 38, as customary international law, with which it must rule
consistently, if possible). For a competent tribunal determination to be
41. Id. at 21-25 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 10n.12.
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dispositive-in the sense that it would preclude adjudication of status by
a military commission-would deny the very right to a judicial
adjudication of status that Article 45 promises. Footnote 38 of the CMCR
opinion states:
[Article 45(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions] suggests
that a detained individual who is not being held as a POW has
the right to assert an entitlement to POW status before a judicial
tribunal, and that judicial adjudication of combatant status shall
occur before trial for any alleged substantive offense. Following
the M.C.A. procedures, as we interpret them here, would allow
an accused to assert a claim of POW (i.e., lawful combatant)
status at a pretrial motion session before the military judge. This
would be fully in accord with
pretrial determination of status
43
Article 45(2) of Protocol 1.
But that cannot be right. Following the CMCR interpretation of the
MCA procedures, the "pretrial determination of status" referred to in
footnote 38 could not occur-much less be "fully in accord with Article
45(2)"-if the military commission was precluded from adjudicating
combatant status because of a pre-existing "dispositive" determination
made by a competent tribunal.
Creating a "safe harbor" for competent tribunal determination by
"carv[ing] out an exception to the military commission's authority to
itself determine jurisdictional matters" 44 clearly would create enormous
legal difficulties. Why would Congress have chosen to produce such an
anomalous situation?
Even while holding that "the military judge is not at liberty to revisit
a C.S.R.T.'s (or other competent tribunal's) finding of 'unlawful enemy
combatant' status when there is such a finding,, 45 the CMCR opinion
does express some discomfort with that arrangement (for example,
asking whether such a limitation on the commission's powers would
infringe the rights prescribed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, as mentioned above).46 The opinion even flirts, at one
point, with the suggestion that the word "dispositive" in the MCA should
not be understood really to mean dispositive, saying, "Congress intended
that properly made individual C.S.R.T. determinations of 'unlawful

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 10 n.38.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-24 (emphasis deleted from original).
See discussion and accompanying text, supra note 21.
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enemy combatant' status established by a preponderance of the 4evidence
7
should be afforded great deference by the military commission.,
But a move in that direction does not offer a solution either. If a
military commission may make its own combatant status determination
notwithstanding a prior determination by a competent tribunal (with
whatever degree of "deference"), and a competent tribunal determination
is not a prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction, then the entire
reference in the MCA to a competent tribunal determination is
superfluous. That is, if a military commission may exercise jurisdiction
even if there is no competent tribunal determination and may make its
own combatant status determination even if there is a competent tribunal
determination, then the competent tribunal provision of the MCA is
meaningless. The determination of combatant status by a competent
tribunal makes absolutely no difference: regardless of the action-or
existence-of a competent tribunal, a military commission may exercise
jurisdiction and may make a combatant status determination in order to
determine its own jurisdiction.
Either
interpretation-"dispositive"
means
dispositive,
or
"dispositive" does not mean dispositive-leads to an absurd result. None
of the anomalous outcomes, absurd results, or violations of the law of
war is necessary. The jurisdictional provisions of the MCA, properly
interpreted, are logical, coherent, and, as we shall see in Section IV
below, fully consistent with the law of war.
Before coming to that, however, we turn to the most recent ruling on
the personal jurisdiction of military commissions and the only
commission ruling thus far to apply the CMCR's Khadr precedent. Omar
Khadr's was the first of two military commission cases to be dismissed
on June 4, 2007. The charges against Salim Hamdan-the only other
military commission defendant then charged-were dismissed, also for
lack of personal jurisdiction, by Judge Keith Allred (Capt. USN) on that
same day.4 8
The Government moved for Judge Allred to reconsider his dismissal
of the charges against Hamdan.4 9 Judge Allred ruled, granting the motion
for reconsideration, after the CMCR issued its decision in Khadr.5 °

47. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 at 10 n.14.
48. See U.S. v. Hamdan, Decision on Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Changes for
Lack of Jurisdiction (Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2007/10/hamdan-ruling-10-17-07.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008)
[hereinafter "Hamdan Decision"].
49. Id. at 1.
50. Id.
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made a motion requesting an Article 5 status
Hamdan thereupon
5
determination.

1

On December 5, 2007, Judge Allred heard oral argument on the
motion for an Article 5 determination and, on December 6, held an
evidentiary hearing on Hamdan's combatant status.5 2 He did so in order
that, if he decided to grant the motion for an Article 5 determinationand if he decided, further, that he himself could serve as that competent
tribunal-he would be prepared to render the combatant status
determination forthwith.
Hamdan's motion made no mention of Article 45; and it made no
mention of the requirement, discussed earlier, 53 that a competent tribunal
be composed of more than one person. Indeed, at oral argument, Joe
McMillan, civilian counsel for Hamdan, conceded that Judge Allred
could, sitting alone, serve as the Article 5 tribunal.
Judge Allred ruled on December 17, 2007, on Hamdan's motion for
an Article 5 status determination. The ruling is marred by two points of
confusion.
First, the ruling confuses Article 5 of the Geneva Convention III of
1949 with Article 45 of Protocol 1 to the 1977 Additional Protocols to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 45), treating the provisions as
though they were one and the same-that one being Article 5 of GC III
(Article 5). 54 Second, the ruling erroneously concludes that, based on the
concession made in oral argument, Hamdan had effectively waived the
requirement that an Article 5 competent tribunal be composed of more
than one person. 55
The December 17 ruling conflates Article 5 of the POW Convention
with Article 45 of Protocol I. Article 5, recall, provides for a presumption
of POW rights and for a combatant status determination by a competent
tribunal in case of doubt. Article 45, in paragraph 1, reiterates the
presumption and the right to a competent tribunal determination and, in
paragraph 2, articulates the right to a judicial adjudication of combatant

51. US. v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination
(Dec. 17, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/hamdan%20article%205%20ruling%2017%20Dec%202007.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008
[hereinafter "Hamdan Ruling"].
52. US. v. Hamdan, On Reconsideration Ruling On Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction (Dec. 19. 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/HamdanJurisdiction%20After/o20Reconsideration%2ORuling.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2008).
53. See discussion supra Part II.
54. See Hamdan Ruling, supra note 51, at 2.
55. See id. at 4.
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status for a detainee, not held as a POW, who is to be tried for crimes
arising out of the hostilities.56
After quoting Article 5 in full, the December 17 ruling states,
Referring to Article 5, Howard S. Levie writes, '[t]he present
article was an attempt to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the
number of instances in which military personnel in the field
make an arbitrary decision that a captured individual is an illegal
combatant and impose summary justice . . . [it] assures the
accused not only of a determination by a competent tribunal, but
of a further judicial tribunal-but only if the detaining power
57
proposes to try him for an offense arising out of the hostilities.'
Article 5, of course, says nothing of the sort. And Howard Levie has
not suggested that it does. The Levie passage, cited as referring to Article
5, refers not to Article 5 but to Article 45.
Article 45 is not referred to by name-or identified as being a
provision distinct from Article 5-anywhere in the body of the ruling.
The words "Article 45" do, however, appear in a citation. Following a
paragraph discussing Article 5 competent-tribunal determinations,
appears a paragraph stating:
When the drafters [of Article 5] sought to clarify when such a
determination should be made, there was disagreement. "In view
of the great differences in national justice procedures, it was not
thought possible to establish a firm rule that this question [an
accused's status] must be decided before the trial for the offense,
but it should be so decided if at all possible, because on it
depends the whole array of procedural protections accorded to
Prisoners of War, by the Third Convention, and the issue may go
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal." 58
Although presented in the text of the ruling as relating to Article 5 of
the POW Convention, the passage quoted is actually from the
Commentary to Protocol I (as the citation in the ruling, reproduced
above, indicates)-and it concerns, of course, Article 45(2) of that
56. See discussion and accompanying text, supra notes 18-21.
57. Hamdan Ruling, supra note 51, at 2 (citing HowARD S. LEVIE, CODE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 504-6 (1986)) (emphasis in original).
58. Id. (quoting INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 556
(Yves Sandoz et. al, eds., 1987)).
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Protocol. The passage quoted in the ruling is, in fact, critically important
when read with recognition that it concerns Article 45. The status
determination discussed in the quotation is the Article 45(2) judicial
adjudication of status. Even it, the Commentary suggests, should be
conducted prior to trial if possible. Since there is no question that the
individual entitled to the judicial adjudication of status has already had a
competent-tribunal status determination by time Article 45(2) comes into
play, it is utterly clear that the drafters of Article 45 intended that the
competent tribunal determination of status would always occur prior to
trial.
The conflation of Articles 5 and 45 leads Judge Alfred to the
untenable conclusion that: (1) two separate status determination
proceedings are required, and (2) he can fulfill that requirement by
holding just one status determination proceeding. 59 The ruling states,
first, that, "the United States is bound not only to perform an initial status
determination, such as that provided for under Army Regulation 190-8
[which implements Article 5], but a second, judicial determination when
60
it proposes to try an [sic] detainee for his participation in hostilities."
Second, the ruling states: "The hearing [that] the Commission will
undertake to determine whether the accused is an alien unlawful enemy
combatant, and therefore subject to the Commission's jurisdiction will
also determine his status for the purposes of Article 5.'61
The two-for-one solution that Judge Allred reaches is not consistent
with the requirements of the law of war, which require two separate
proceedings. A POW may not be subjected to military commission
jurisdiction; and a detainee is a presumptive POW until a competent
tribunal determines otherwise. 62 The judicial adjudication of status is
designated as a second process, intended to afford a second look, brining
judicial scrutiny to the status determination in cases where the
significance of that determination is going to be elevated by criminal
proceedings.
If the two proceedings are combined and conducted by a military
commission then, obviously, a presumptive POW will be well along in a
criminal prosecution by military commission before the first status
determination procedure ever occurs. This is exactly what has happened
to Salim Hamdan. When Judge Allred issued his December 17th decision
granting Hamdan an Article 5 status determination, Hamdan had been
under military commission jurisdiction for well over three years. No
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Protocol I, supranote 11, at art. 45(1).
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proceeding whatsoever had been conducted prior to that time to
determine whether he was a lawful or an unlawful combatant. 63 As will
be discussed infra, the attachment of military commission jurisdiction is
a significant event, burdensome to the accused, even where the process
moves more quickly than has Hamdan's. 64 Judge Allred's decision to
combine "[t]he hearing [that] the Commission will undertake to
determine whether the accused is an alien unlawful enemy combatant,
and therefore subject to the Commission's jurisdiction 65 with a status
determination procedure "for purposes of Article 5" presumably arises
from the failure, reflected in the ruling, to distinguish between the
requirements of Article 5 and those of Article 45.
Concerning the number of people required to constitute an Article 5
tribunal, the December 17 ruling notes that the official Commentary to
Article 5 indicates that the text of Article 5 was amended to employ the
term "military tribunal" in place of the original language of "competent
authority." As Judge Allred observes, "[t]his amendment was based on
the view that decisions which might have the gravest consequences
should not be left to a single person., 66 Indeed, the negotiating history of
Article 5 makes clear that establishment of a system requiring a tribunal
of several people rather than an individual decision-maker was a
primary-perhaps the primary-goal motivating the promulgation of
Article 5. This requirement that an Article 5 tribunal be composed of
more than one person is reflected in US Army Regulation 190-8 ("AR
190-8"), which implements US obligations under Article 5. AR 190-8
defines a "competent tribunal" as "composed of three commissioned
officers. 67
Judge Allred, thus, accurately identifies the composition requirement
for an Article 5 tribunal. He fails to observe, however, that the
requirement is non-waivable. The ruling states that the "parties have
conceded that this Commission is a competent tribunal within the
meaning of Article 5.,,68 Of course, Judge Allred knows that it is not-at
least not as to its number of members. But, apparently taking Hamdan's
"concession" at oral argument to be an effective waiver of Article 5's

63. Military commission jurisdiction first attached to Hamdan when he was charged
for trial by military commission in July of 2004. Those charges became null when the
Supreme Court struck down the first military commissions system in 2006. Hamdan was
then re-charged under the MCA in 2007.
64. See discussion, infra Part IV.
65. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 690.
66. Hamdan Ruling, supra note 51, at 2.
67. US Army Regulation 190-8, ch. I, § 1-6(c).
68. Hamdan Ruling, supra note 51, at 4.
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composition requirement, Judge Allred concludes that he may sit as an
Article 5 tribunal. 69
In fact, however, Judge Allred may not sit as an Article 5 tribunal
because Hamdan may not waive or renounce his rights under the Geneva
Conventions. Article 7 of GC III, entitled "Non-Renunciation of Rights,"
provides that, "[p]risoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in
part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
convention., 70 Recall that Hamdan, at the relevant time, having had no
competent-tribunal determination to the contrary, was entitled to the
rights secured by the POW Convention-a point which Judge Allred
himself makes in the ruling. Such an absolute rule barring waiver of
rights was considered necessary by the drafters of the POW Convention
because to permit the waiver of POW rights would render those rights
nearly meaningless, given the ease with which duress may be applied to
detainees. 7 1 To give effect, then, to a "concession" by Hamdan
ostensibly waiving a part of Article 5 creates an undesirable inroad into
the rules erected to safeguard POW rights.
The practice of and jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction under the
MCA clearly has not come to a resting place. Judge Brownback's June 4,
2007 ruling dismissing the charges against Omar Khadr correctly applied
the MCA. It did not, though, provide a full articulation of the reasons or
the legal support for the outcome and, in particular, did not present the
analysis in relation to the intemational law of war. The subsequent
decisions on personal jurisdiction under the MCA, issued by the CMCR
and by Judge Allred, continue to grapple with a set of issues that have
yet to be resolved.
IV. MILITARY COMMISSION JURISDICTION UNDER THE MCA
The jurisdictional puzzle of the MCA should be readily put together.
When read alongside the pre-existing international law of war governing
military commission jurisdiction and combatant status determinations,
the MCA becomes far more transparent and, indeed, perfectly coherent.
The MCA could not be clearer in limiting the jurisdiction of military
commissions to unlawful combatants. The purpose of the MCA is to
establish "procedures governing the use of military commissions to try
alien unlawful enemy combatants ....

"72The act provides "[a] military

commission under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to try any offense
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
GC III, supra note 11, art. 7 (emphasis added).
See Commentary to GC III, supra note 11, at 89.
10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2006).
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made punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an
alien unlawful enemy combatant ... In an abundance of caution, the
Act further states that, "military commissions under this chapter shall not
have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants. Lawful enemy
combatants who violate the law of war are subject to [courts martial]. 74
The MCA is, unmistakably, fully consistent with the law of war in this
respect: lawful combatants (POWs) may be prosecuted only before the
same courts-courts martial-as US service members would be.
The MCA, properly interpreted, provides for the lawful
determination of combatant status by a competent tribunal prior to the
attachment of military commission jurisdiction. The MCA articulates
two definitions of the term "unlawful combatant." The act states:
The term 'unlawful enemy combatant' means i) A person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al
Qaeda, or associated forces); or
ii) A person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment
of the Military Commission At of 2006 has been determined to
be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the
75
authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
As the CMCR pointed out in its Khadr opinion, the two definitions
are posed disjunctively. One or the other may apply. What the Act does
not make adequately clear on its face is that the definition properly to be
applied depends on the phase and posture of the case.
The definition based on a status determination by a "competent
tribunal" is applicable at the outset, as a threshold requirement for any
exercise of military commission jurisdiction. Only after the presumptive
right to POW treatment has been lawfully rebutted through a
determination of unlawful combatant status by a competent tribunal, may
military commission jurisdiction attach in the first instance.
Once military commission jurisdiction has lawfully attached, the
military commission may adjudicate its own jurisdiction-exercising the
73. 10 U.S.C. § 948d(a) (2006).

74. 10 U.S.C. § 948d(b) (2006).
75. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006).
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inherent jurisdiction of all courts to do so. When the commission thus
adjudicates combatant status to determine its own jurisdiction in the
course of the criminal litigation, the substantive definition of unlawful
combatant status found in 10 U.S.C. § 948a(2) is to be applied.
A military commission may not make the initial determination of
unlawful combatant status that is prerequisite to the exercise of military
commission jurisdiction. Other courts, by contrast, routinely exercise
jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction as an initial matter--even
while recognizing that the jurisdictional inquiry may result in a
determination that the court has (and, in some sense, had) no jurisdiction
over the case. Military commissions are unlike other courts in this
respect because of the presumption of POW status, which excludes
potential defendants from military commission jurisdiction unless and
until that presumption is lawfully rebutted by a competent tribunal. The
operation of the presumption is utterly clear in the law of war-as is the
sole lawful means for rebutting that presumption.
The MCA provides that, "[a] finding . . . by a [CSRT] or another
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the
Secretary of Defense that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is
dispositive for the purposes of jurisdiction for trial by a military
commission."' 76 The competent-tribunal finding is "dispositive" in that
nothing additional is required to rebut the presumptive POW status, there
is no further prerequisite to establishing initial military-commission
jurisdiction, and there is no appellate review of the tribunal's
determination for purposes of military commission jurisdiction. As stated
in the Rules for Military Commissions:
A finding ... by a... competent tribunal.., that a person is an
unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of
jurisdiction for trial by a military commission under the M.C.A.
The determination by the tribunal shall apply for purposes of
regard to any pending
military commission jurisdiction without
77
petitions for review or other appeals."
It makes perfect sense that Congress would have stated that a
competent tribunal determination is "dispositive for purposes of
jurisdiction for trial by military commission."08That is because,
elsewhere in the MCA, provision is made for federal appellate review of
competent-tribunal combatant status determinations. To ensure that the
76. 10 U.S.C. § 948d(c) (2006).

77. R.M.C. § 202(b).
78. 10 U.S.C. § 948d(c) (2006).
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federal review would not delay the exercise of initial jurisdiction by
military commissions, Congress specified that the competent tribunal
determination shall be dispositive "for purposes ofjurisdictionfor trial
by military commission. ' , 79 This does not mean that, at that trial, the
court is prohibited from making such findings as are required to
determine its own jurisdiction. It means, rather, that no pending appeal or
review will prevent the competent-tribunal finding from forming the
basis for the initial exercise of military commission jurisdiction.
The determination of unlawful combatancy by a competent tribunal
is thus dispositive of military commission jurisdiction under the MCA in
that "the determination by the tribunal shall apply for purposes of
military commission jurisdiction without regard to any pending petitions
for review or other appeals., 80 But the finding of the competent tribunal
is not-and could not be-dispositive of military commission
jurisdiction in the sense that it would divest the military commission of
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. . The jurisdiction to
determine its own jurisdiction has long been recognized as fundamental
among the necessary and inherent powers of a court. 81 The Rules for
Military Commissions make the point succinctly, stating: "[a] military
commission 82always has jurisdiction to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.',
A military commission, as a regular part of its functions in
conducting criminal proceedings, may hear motions challenging its
jurisdiction over the accused. 83 A motion challenging military
commission jurisdiction may be based upon an assertion of POW
status.84 The second definition of unlawful combatancy under the MCA,
which provides the substantive elements of unlawful combatant status,
is to be applied by the military commission in adjudicating combatant
status to determine its own jurisdiction.

79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. R.M.C. § 202(b).
81. See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947); Cargill Ferrous
Intern. v. Sea Phoenix MV, 325 F.3d 695, 704 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[A] bedrock principle of
federal courts is that they have jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction."); Nestor v.
Hershey, 425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("we always have jurisdiction to determine our
jurisdiction"); United States v. Harmon, 63 M.J. 98, 101 (C.A.A.F. 2006); U.S. v.
Melanson, 53 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2000). See also Government's Brief on Behalf of
Appellant at 20, in Khadr, CMCR 07-001.
82. R.M.C. § 201(b)(3) (emphasis added).
83. R.M.C. § 907(b)(1)(A).
84. See R.M.C. § 901(b)(l)(A); 10 U.S.C. § 948d(c) (2006).
85. 10 U.S.C. 948a(1)(ii) (2006).
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Read in this way, the MCA's jurisdictional regime, which might
otherwise seem to pose a conundrum, is perfectly logical and legally
sound. The MCA requires, as a prerequisite for the initial exercise of
military commission jurisdiction, a finding of unlawful combatancy by a
competent tribunal. And it treats that finding as dispositive for
establishing initial military commission jurisdiction. The MCA provides,
further, that a military commission, once lawfully seized of a case, may
hear motions challenging jurisdiction and may adjudicate combatant
status to confirm or disconfirm its own jurisdiction. There is no
contradiction between these two prongs of the jurisdictional regime
established by the MCA.
As Judge Brownback stated in his order of June 4, 2007:
[I]t is clear that the MCA contemplates a two-part system. First,
it anticipates that there shall be an administrative decision by
[which the CSRT] will establish the status of a person for
purposes of the MCA ....
Second, once the CSRT finds that a person is an unlawful enemy
combatant, the provisions of the MCA come into play. 86
That two-step jurisdictional structure established by the MCA is
consistent with-indeed, as we have seen, is precisely what is required
by-the law of war. Under the MCA, the competent tribunal
determination of unlawful combatant status rebuts the presumptive
entitlement to POW rights-consistent with Article 5 of the POW
Convention and Article 45(1) of Protocol I. And, as required by Article
45(2), the MCA provides that a detainee who is held as a non-POW
pursuant to a competent-tribunal determination, and is to be tried for an
offense arising out of the hostilities, is entitled to a de novo, judicial
adjudication of status upon submission of a motion challenging the
personal jurisdiction of the military commission.
The MCA, properly interpreted, defines a process fully in keeping
with the two-step status-determination procedure mandated by the law of
war. Fundamental canons of statutory interpretation require that the
MCA be so construed. As the Supreme Court stated in the Charming
Betsy case, "[a]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains," 87 and
86. Judge Brownback's Order Dismissing Charges, U.S. v. Khadr, 6-7, June 4, 2007,
availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/news/jun2007/khadrJudgesDismissalOrder(June%204).pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
87. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
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statutory ambiguity should be resolved in favor of compliance with
international law. 88 Ingrained in US jurisprudence, the Charming Betsy
canon has thus guided US courts for over two centuries.89 In the case of
the MCA, the mandate that courts interpret a statute to render its
provisions coherent and avoid absurdity in the law's application favorsperhaps necessitates-the same reading
V. THE CURRENT POSTURE
The procedures currently applied by the US military commissions
violate the plain language and clear intent of the MCA and the law of
war. In every case brought under the MCA, charges have been sworn,
jurisdiction asserted, and powers exercised without essential prerequisite
for jurisdiction-a finding of unlawful combatant status by a competent
tribunal.
Rule for Military Commission 202(c) states: "the jurisdiction of a
military commission over an individual attaches upon the swearing of
charges." 90 The presumptive POW status of a detainee must, therefore,
be rebutted-through a finding of unlawful combatancy by a competent
tribunal-before charges may lawfully be sworn. Absent an unlawfulcombatancy finding by a competent tribunal, the detainee is entitled to
POW treatment which, under the MCA as under the law of war,
precludes the attachment of military commission jurisdiction.
The "premature" attachment of jurisdiction under the MCA is not a
trifling matter to be cured nunc pro tunc in some later proceeding. The
attachment of jurisdiction begins the process of prosecution. The accused
is now informed that he is to be tried by military commission for
specified crimes. 91 The sequence of pretrial proceedings begins and its
timetables start running. 92 A defense lawyer appears 93 and discovery is
begun. And, at each step, power is exercised by the personnel of the
88. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marinos de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963);
see also F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
89. See, e.g., F. Hoffman - La Roche Ltd. v. Empagram S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 166
(2004) (looking to customary international law in interpreting the Sherman Act and
concluding that it did not apply to a foreign price-fixing claim); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (relying upon customary international law in determining the
statutory construction of the Jones Act in a maritime tort case); Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) at 118.
90. R.M.C. 202(c).
91. 10 U.S.C. § 948q(b) (2006).
92. R.M.C. 707.
93. 10 U.S.C. § 948k(3) (2006) ("Military defense counsel for a military commission
under this chapter shall be detailed as soon as practicable after the swearing of charges
against the accused.").
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military commissions system. The prosecutor, the defense counsel, and
the convening authority begin actively making decisions and taking
actions with potentially profound consequences for the detainee.
Among the several serious consequences of the attachment of
military commission jurisdiction is the exclusion of the detainee from the
Administrative Review Board (ARB) process. The ARB is tasked with
conducting "an administrative review process to assess annually the need
to continue to detain each enemy combatant." 94 ARB review entails the
possibility of release, repatriation, or amelioration of the conditions of
custody for detainees deemed "no longer a threat to the United States and
its allies. '95 Upon attachment of military commission jurisdiction, the
accused are "excepted from the procedures established in [the ARB]
Order until the disposition of any charges against96them or the service of
any sentence imposed by a military commission.
The MCA prohibits the attachment of military commission
jurisdiction over lawful combatants. Yet, in each case brought before the
military commissions in Guantanamo, the defendant-having had no
status determination by a competent tribunal-has been entitled to a
presumption of lawful combatant status and to all of the accompanying
rights including the right to trial not by military commission but by court
martial.
In each of those cases, then, the charges were jurisdictionally
defective when sworn, having been sworn against an individual
statutorily exempted from military commission jurisdiction under the
MCA. 97 Neither action by the convening authority nor by the military
commission judge can cure the defect. Unless and until the presumption
of POW rights is lawfully rebutted by a competent tribunal, the accused
is presumptively a lawful combatant to whom, the MCA explicitly states,
jurisdiction may not attach.
VI. CONCLUSION

The jurisdictional provisions of the MCA are not as clear as they
might be; and this has caused serious problems. In violation of both the
MCA and the law of war, the prosecutions brought under the MCA have
94. Paul Wolfowitz, Order for Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy
Combatants in the Control of the. Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval

Base, Cuba (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/d20040518gtmoreview.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 4.
97. See R.M.C. 905(b)(1) on jurisdictional defects in preferral and referral.
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been brought without a prior determination of the defendants' status by a
competent tribunal. Each, therefore, has constituted an unlawful exercise
of military commission jurisdiction over a presumptively lawful
combatant who is, by virtue of that status, exempted from military
commission jurisdiction under the MCA and the law of war. The military
commission proceedings in the cases brought to date, having thus been
conducted without legislative authorization and outside the scope of the
commissions' lawful authority, are legally void.
The jurisdictional scheme of the MCA is greatly clarified when read
in conjunction with a close and detailed reading of the relevant law of
war. Indeed, the jurisdictional structure delineated in the MCA is
revealed to be both logically consistent and consistent with the law of
war governing the personal jurisdiction of military commissions.
It may well be that the law of war-and, in particular, the law of war
governing combatant status, detention, and prosecution-is not well
suited to the "war on terror." If, however, that body of law is to be
invoked and is to serve as the basis for the detention of "combatants"--a
choice that Congress has made in enacting the MCA-then it must be
applied faithfully. To do otherwise will do damage to the law of war, the
welfare of future POWs including US service members, the international
reputation of the US, and the integrity of our own polity.
This should be an easy call. The MCA provides for compliance with
the relevant features of the law of war and, indeed, demands it. What is
required to achieve a coherent interpretation of the MCA's personal
jurisdiction framework, to attain compliance in military commissions
practice with that interpretation, and to fulfill US obligations under the
relevant law of war is to conduct a handful of combatant status
determinations before competent tribunals. The cost of erosion of the law
is high; and, in this instance, the cost of compliance is miniscule.

